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Towards a Politics for Human Rights: Ambiguous Humanity and 
Democratizing Rights1 
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Department of International Politics, City University London 
 
Abstract 
Human rights are a suspect project – this seems the only sensible starting point today. This 
suspicion, however, is not absolute and the desire to preserve and reform human rights persists for 
many of us. The most important contemporary critiques of human rights focus on the problematic 
consequences of the desire for universal rights. These criticisms are pursued with varying 
intensities, as some defenders of human rights are willing to accept elements of this critique in their 
reformulations, while staunch opponents remain wary of the desire to think and act in language of 
human rights because of the deep pathologies of rights-thinking as a political ethics. Yet, we 
hesitate to abandon human rights. In this paper, I look at the political critique of human rights in 
greater detail.  I argue that an agonistic account drawing on the work of William Connolly and 
Bonnie Honig offers the best response to the most important contemporary critiques of human 
rights, and a clearer account of what it means to claim that human rights do valuable work. The key 
developments of this agonistic view of human rights are its focus on the ambiguity of “humanity” 
as a political identity, and the challenge to legitimate authority and membership that new rights 
claims make. In the end, human rights are defended as a universal political ethos focused on the 
pluralization and democratization of global politics. 
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Human rights are a suspect project – this seems the only sensible starting point today. This 
suspicion, however, is not absolute and the desire to preserve and reform human rights persists for 
many of us. As we move beyond debates over universalism and particularism, the most important 
contemporary critiques focus on the problematic consequences of the desire for universal human 
rights. This aspiration drives both the effort to develop an effective international human rights 
regime and the pursuit of philosophical justifications of universal moral rights. Contemporary 
critics of human rights, however, suggest that human rights justify the objectionable use of power 
by dominant political authorities. Slavoj Žižek puts it bluntly: ‘“Man”, the bearer of human rights, 
is generated by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship; “human rights” are, as 
such, a false ideological universality, which masks and legitimizes a concrete politics of Western 
imperialism, military interventions and neo-colonialism.’2 Following on from this denunciation of 
the universalizing aspiration of human rights, critics have found fault with the political vision those 
rights support, of an increasingly integrated and legalized world politics defined by expanding 
international institutions and facilitated by the development of international law.3 The faults 
identified range from skepticism regarding the plausibility of such a transformation, to the charge 
that it reflects a disabling neo-imperial vision of world politics in which the human rights offered to 
the weak and suffering can only be protected by powerful Western states claiming an autopoietic 
right of intervention. These criticisms are pursued with varying intensities, as some defenders of 
human rights are willing to accept elements of this critique in their reformulations,4 while staunch 
opponents remain wary of the desire to think and act in language of human rights because of the 
deep pathologies of rights-thinking as a political ethics.5 
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 Yet, we hesitate to abandon human rights. We worry that it is an ethical vernacular with 
some effective power, which even intransigent critics seek to preserve in some measure.6 In what 
follows, I look at the political critique of human rights in greater detail. The strong version of the 
critique goes beyond a claim that the de facto politics of human rights are objectionable and 
suggests that the impulse to legislate a singular conception of political legitimacy in terms of 
universal moral principle is corrosive. An important conclusion drawn from this argument is that 
human rights necessarily reinforce rather than constrain sovereignty. This is an especially damning 
conclusion as it suggests that the political vision of human rights is problematic beyond its tendency 
to reinforce the power of national authorities and Western states (who must be trusted to respect 
rights as a largely un-enforced condition of their legitimacy). Even if there were a successful 
transformation to a cosmopolitan politics that could offer fuller protection to individuals subject to 
state authority, sovereign power would be relocated to the global level rather than truly tamed or 
eliminated. A cosmopolitan transformation is presumed to guarantee fuller protection of individual 
rights, even as such a transformation would need to be underwritten by Western powers, as this 
partiality could be overcome through a moralization and legalization of world politics.7 However, 
criticisms suggesting that human rights depend upon exceptional sovereign authority upset this 
redemptive coda and raise the troubling possibility that human rights necessarily remain an 
exclusionary and violent project. 
 
 Responding to this critique requires a conceptual reconstruction of the relationship between 
morality and politics that human rights presume. Critics and supporters share an analysis of what 
human rights do, but differ on the desirability of their consequences. Moving away from a view of 
human rights as a limit upon the excesses of sovereign authority via universal moral principles, the 
reconstruction called for here favors an agonistic understanding of rights. This alternative focuses 
on the possibility of using human rights to make new and plural claims on authority, including calls 
for fundamental changes in the social order, through a distinct form of contestation enabled by the 
appeal to humanity.8 If we do not assume that the moral significance of humanity as a political 
identity is, or should be, singular or absolute then the act of claiming human rights has the potential 
to disrupt given accounts of the political subject, as well as the given boundaries of political 
community. The central insight pursued here is that when critics hesitate to disavow human rights 
completely, when they appeal to their potentially positive but often ambiguous, consequences, they 
are appealing to the contribution that human rights make to political struggles challenging 
established authority and increasing the democratic control people have over their own lives. Yet, 
when this claim is made it is not analyzed sufficiently, nor is its significance followed through in 
our understanding and judgment of human rights. In conclusion, I argue that an agonistic account 
not only offers the best response to the most important contemporary critiques of human rights, but 
also offers a clearer account of what it means to claim that human rights do valuable work and how 
such a claim might be evaluated critically rather than taken on faith. 
 
The Politics of Human Rights 
 
Today almost everyone accepts that human rights are political, but what that means is less clear. At 
their core human rights claim that there are protections, privileges and duties that apply to every 
human being, which must be respected by any political authority legitimately exercising power over 
people. On first hearing, to say that human rights are political seems to call into question their status 
as universal norms of social life. To admit that their force is neither written into the nature of things 
nor obvious to the minds of all right thinking human beings implies that they cannot be a neutral 
moral backstop protecting us from the vagaries of political power. In part, this is an expression of 
our post-metaphysical sensibility, in which the presumption that morality can be justified in a 
manner that transcends convention is always suspect. If we accept that human rights are social 
constructions, then it follows that they express the political order in which they have been created. 
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Our suspicion is also partly an expression of skepticism regarding the motives of authorities 
claiming to protect human rights, as the admission that human rights are only conventional gives 
weight to the view that they are an ideological expression of the interests of Western powers 
exercising a significant degree of control over weaker states and disempowered people. If we 
suspect that human rights might be unavoidably political, we are forced to consider whether those 
politics are objectionable – and it would seem that for many people they are.9 This forms the 
intellectual backdrop for much contemporary human rights thinking and has led both supporters and 
critics of human rights to discuss them in terms of whether the politics of human rights can be 
justified. 
 
Redeeming Human Rights 
 
 The ubiquity of a political conception of human rights10 must be nearly incontestable if even 
Rawlsian liberalism has made a “political” turn. For a tradition described by Chantal Mouffe as 
resting ‘on the elimination of the very idea of the political’,11 the move to a political conception of 
justice is significant. In Joshua Cohen’s work the nascent and minimalist account of human rights 
present in Rawls’ Law of Peoples is expanded and elaborated.12 Rawls’ move to a political 
justification for rights is based on his concession that a philosophical consensus is impossible under 
conditions of diversity,13 and thus must be replaced by a more modest aspiration to a political 
consensus on the terms of justice based in public reason.14 Public reason is the form of address 
citizens use with each other within a liberal democracy, where the agreement on a common 
philosophical worldview is impossible and a political consensus is not only the best possible but 
also the proper justification for a theory of justice. In Law of Peoples, public reason at the 
international level (which for Rawls involves address between independent peoples) dictates 
minimalist rules for the interaction between states, as peoples are concerned primarily with 
toleration and limiting exceptions to the norm of non-intervention to the most severe violations of 
basic human rights.15 Cohen expands this narrow conception of international justice and argues for 
an account of global public reason that addresses the question of what any legitimate political 
authority owes to every person it exercises power over rather than the question of what sovereign 
peoples owe to each other. Reinterpreting the practical purpose of public reason in global terms 
leads to a revised role for, and a more substantive list of, human rights, which provide universal 
standards of membership in political community, defining the legitimacy of sovereign authorities in 
terms of their obligations to individual members.16 
 
 While this move to a political conception of rights takes us some way from the idea that 
human rights are moral principles inscribed in nature or demanded by reason, the function of 
human rights remains to limit political contestation, to articulate the list of what must and must not 
be done. The politics of human rights must be addressed, redeemed and made reasonable, but this 
process of justification renders the partially of human rights morally legitimate. The limit itself, 
however, is preserved as an uncontested given, defined by the purposes of political association 
revealed by the philosopher’s insight into the ideal of global public reason.17 The central worry 
among Rawlsians is how to redeem human rights by disassociating them from the interests of 
powerful political actors imposing their will on others. Public reason, whether understood to aim at 
minimal toleration between peoples or universal standards of political membership owed to every 
individual, is intended to provide a legitimate starting point for human rights outside of an 
illegitimate politics of coercion and imposition. Instead, human rights are justified by an unforced 
consensus around the dictates of public reason, which justifies human rights by alienating them 
from their origins. Yet, this alienation does little to address the legacy of human rights, both 
historical and conceptual, as instruments of discipline and control, as instruments of power. As 
Wendy Brown reminds us, human rights ‘are not simply rules and defenses against power, but can 
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themselves be tactics and vehicles of governance and domination,’18 which undermines the too 
readily presumed existence of a consensus on the terms of legitimate authority. 
 
 The Rawlsian tradition, after making its political turn, rests precariously on an appeal to 
reasonable consensus and social convention. Public reason, while regulative, depends upon a sense 
of shared purpose presumed to be broadly accepted by those it applies to, which solves the problem 
of how to justify principles of justice and the demands of right, but at the cost of opening up the 
problems of politics. These problems include the questions of what the purpose of society should 
be, where the boundaries of political community should be drawn, how we know a consensus exists 
and who determines that a consensus is authoritative. In a move that irritates many of his former 
acolytes, but which is consistent philosophically, Rawls’ own work provides no escape from these 
questions other than convention. The failure to address the politics of human rights within the 
Rawlsian tradition lies in its unwillingness to interrogate convention – in Rawls’ case it is not clear 
why we should accept the conventional norms of international society, which entail a limited set of 
human rights that determine when intervention by the powerful is permissible; while in Cohen’s 
case it’s not clear why we should accept the liberal cannon of international human rights that 
constructs membership in terms of individual citizens bound together in a national state and seeking 
protection and privilege from a singular and secular sovereign authority, even if such an account 
could be justified within other worldviews.19 Admitting that one starts with a political end in mind 
is a very limited acknowledgement of the politics of human rights, as the question of who 
determines our starting point is unaddressed, both in terms of who has that authority and whose 
starting point is determinate of our reasonable public ends.  
 
 The limits of this conception of human rights are created by the problem this revision is 
intended to address: skepticism about the possibility of justifying universal principles to all those 
affected, rather than a concern that determinate (if not absolute) universalized principles are an 
assault on difference as such. While starting with a Habermasian framework that identifies a similar 
challenge in the attempt to rationally justify moral principle, Seyla Benhabib’s work more fully 
addresses the political problems opened up by abandoning faith in justifications that transcend 
convention, even as she seeks to preserve the force of the rational moral law as a way of 
constraining politics. Benhabib’s understanding of human rights comes out of the paradoxical 
relationship between universal rights and democratic self-determination. She defends human rights 
as universal moral norms, which express the necessary conditions for seeking consensus on specific 
normative questions and define the equal concern and recognition due to every individual in that 
process of communicative reasoning.20 These rights include individual entitlements that are 
necessary for autonomy and a guarantee of participation in the political life of the community. The 
legal expression of these norms is found in liberal and republican traditions – rights both protect 
individuals from the modern state and empower them as participants in a political community.21 
There is, however, a tension here, as universal rights place limits on the self-determination of the 
political community. Some self-legislation is forbidden.22 Where moral principle fails and the will 
of the community or the sovereign violates the integrity of the individual, legitimate authority is 
lost. In political terms, this paradox is expressed in the conclusion that the spread of human rights 
norms requires the expansion of liberal and representative forms of government both to 
communities lacking appropriate domestic structures and in transnational forms of governance 
beyond the national state.  
 
 This conclusion generates two problems. First, universal human rights require the 
imposition of a political structure and an account of the universal individual upon existing 
communities and persons with potentially very different subjectivities. Benhabib is aware of this 
problem. Drawing on revisions to discourse ethics made in her earlier work,23 she argues that 
legitimate human rights norms are worked out through democratic iterations in which culturally 
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specific human rights are re-made as ‘elements in the public culture of democratic peoples through 
their own process of interpretation articulation, and iteration.’24 While human rights entail 
protections for individuals that trump the de facto authority of the community and communal 
authority requires guarantees of democratic participation, Benhabib suggests that the final form that 
human rights standards will take depends upon the context in which they are worked out. On this 
account the universal individual finds expression through an actual person, therefore a space for 
particularity must be preserved, even as it is disciplined by universal principles. The second 
problem Benhabib’s account of rights generates is that it undermines the priority given to the 
territorial state in favor of a more expansive democratic order, but without a clear guide to how the 
boundaries of legitimate political community should be established. If everyone has a right to 
participate in decisions that affect them, then potentially everyone has a right to participation 
everywhere. This has implications for international order, as it would appear that morality requires 
a cosmopolitan order in place of our current state-centric one. Benhabib addresses this issue by 
accepting the necessity of a form democratic sovereignty that extends beyond the nation-state to a 
form of global constitutionalism, but without seeking to eliminate or completely transcend the state. 
Instead the state must find its legitimacy in a cosmopolitan field with multiple levels of governance 
and participation, institutionalizing not a singular human community, but a community of humanity 
that enables and is legitimated by universal rights that protect individuals not only from excessive 
state violence, but also social and economic harms endemic to global capitalism, while also 
guarantying the sanctity of forms of community in which individual identity, ethical values and 
communal autonomy are protected from unjust intervention.25 The community of humanity, then, is 
a diverse community of communities, the members of which preserve their distinctiveness even as 
morality requires they abide by universal principles of legitimacy.  
 
 There are many virtues in Benhabib’s justification of human rights. She allows for an 
important degree of contestation in the articulation of human rights through her ideas of democratic 
iterations and jurisgenerative politics.26 First, the appeal to democratic iterations highlights the 
necessity of contextualization, as human rights norms are not simply accepted as they are 
articulated in international institutions, but must be re-made and applied in context through the 
democratic process. Second, the jurisgenerative nature of law, as she describes it, denies the 
capacity of powerful institutions and actors to authoritatively determine the social norms expressed 
through the law. The wider process of political contestation shapes the law, which allows human 
rights to remain critical and potentially subversive of established power. The degree of contestation 
and difference that is allowed, however, is still constrained, as it is only when universal moral 
principles are upheld that it can be said that there ‘is legitimate “unity and diversity” in human 
rights among well-ordered polities.’27 So, even as democratic iterations lead to diversity, they also 
lead to convergence, because the moral principles that provide the foundation of rights cannot be 
contradictory or ambiguous.  
 
 Honig suggests that Benhabib and other Habermasians assume ‘a chrono-logic in relation to 
which they assess new rights: new rights-claims are judged in terms of the rights’ amenability to 
being subsumed under existing constitutional or universal categories.’28 As she goes on to argue, 
Benhabib cannot ‘see how new rights-claims do not necessarily demand mere inclusion in a 
previously stabilized order. They may. But they may also demand a new world. They may unsettle 
previously existing categories of right.’29 This approach to rights is required by the role that 
universal moral principles play in constraining politics by limiting contestation and imposing order. 
Even as Benhabib is sensitive to preserving difference, her framework must presuppose the 
universal moral subject and her place in the political community as an individual rights holder in a 
constitutional democracy. Kimberly Hutchings gets at the limits of this approach, saying that if ‘one 
accepts this, then clearly one has again returned to a version of liberal universalism which always 
already knows its moral superiority.’30 The difficulties that both Rawlsian and Habermasian 
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traditions have in offering a political justification for moral universals that does not require placing 
some portion of their particular foundations beyond contestation – such as the presumed consensus 
on the purpose of public reason or the promise of the progressive realization of democratic 
individuality in a cosmopolitan community – highlights the difficulty of avoiding universalism’s 
essentializing tendencies, its potential to eliminate difference and preserve the given order.  The 
troubling possibility raised by these difficulties is that an understanding of political ethics based on 
the redemption of sovereign power through its subordination to universal rights in a legal order 
might be unacceptable at the same time that it seems necessary. 
 
Renouncing Human Rights? 
 
While both Rawlsians and Habermasians attempt to reformulate the transformations of 
authority required by human rights in light of the difficulty of finding acceptable justifications, they 
remain committed to the desirability of such a transformation. At an unreflective level this 
imposition of universal standards of sovereign legitimacy and political inclusion seems 
praiseworthy. Yet, the difficulties we encounter in trying to justify rights with some measure of 
final authority generates anxiety that the legacy of universal rights, expressed in our contemporary 
human rights discourse, promises only a hollow emancipation – one that reinforces rather than 
restrains or reforms sovereign power. Human rights look very different from an anti-universalist 
perspective, as it is not the difficulty of justifying universality but the desire for universality that is 
the problem. The politics of human rights are problematic beyond their association with discredited 
or destructive ideological projects.31 As Wendy Brown shows in her critique of human rights, the 
transformation they promise may actually be both hollow and pernicious.  
 
To illustrate the hollowness of the transformation promised by human rights, Brown returns 
to Marx’s critique of liberal rights in On the Jewish Question32 in order to argue that they provide 
only a formal transformation, one that is not intended to address the causes of social grievance and 
suffering.33 This goes beyond a charge of hypocrisy, as it is a faith in the capacity of moral and 
legal rights to alleviate social misery that draws our focus away from the work of changing the 
structures of exploitation and oppression. It is this distraction that Marx characterized as the 
ideological limit of the liberal rights tradition.  
 
The substitution of abstract political subjects for actual ones not only forfeits the project 
of emancipation but resubjugates us precisely by emancipating substitutes for us – by 
emancipating our abstracted representatives in the state and naming this process 
“freedom.” The subject is thus ideally emancipated through its anointing as an abstract 
person, a formally free and equal human being, and is practically resuborinated through 
his idealist disavowal of the material constituents of personhood, which constrain and 
contain our freedom.34 
 
Rights, then, may offer recognition, but their capacity to change the lived experience of rights-
holders is limited to granting formal status within the given social world. This granting of status 
then pushes the individual into civil society where she is free but lacks substantive equality. 
Further, the formal emancipation offered by rights creates a dependence upon the power of the 
state, as social harms are redressed not through political struggle but inclusion in the regime of 
equal rights granted by the sovereign.35 
 
Marx, while critical of liberal rights, did see that formal emancipation was better than 
institutionalized inequality and could contribute to true human emancipation. Brown argues that 
rights do not simply fail to substantively liberate individuals from illegitimate forms power, but that 
liberal rights are part of a broader field of social power. Engaging Foucault’s work as an expansion 
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of Marx’s critique, Brown traces the way that rights serve to construct subjects that internalize the 
limited emancipation offered to them. Rights are part of the discourse and practice of political life 
and their power construct the subjects of rights in particular ways, they ‘pervasively configure a 
political culture (rather than merely occupying a niche within it) and discursively produce the 
political subject (rather than serving as the instrument of such a subject).’36 The conventional rights 
discourse not only fails to recognize or address this form of power, but it also constructs its subjects 
as dependent and vulnerable, as isolated and disempowered in their relations with sovereign 
authority, as the ‘disciplinary production of identity may become the site of rights struggles that 
naturalize and thus entrench the powers of which those identities are the effects.’37 Thus vulnerable 
subjects must seek out the state – or alternative international authority – to provide for their well-
being. The emancipatory promise of such rights is thus rendered as the preservation of vulnerable 
life, rather than the pursuit of substantive justice or political empowerment.  
 
Responding to Michael Ignatieff’s defense of human rights as a minimalist morality, Brown 
applies her general critique of rights to the specific discourse of international human rights. She 
begins by identifying the limited emancipation that human rights promise ‘as a moral discourse 
centered on pain and suffering rather than [a] political discourse of comprehensive justice.’ Rights, 
however, are more than protections that individuals claim against government authorities to ward 
off threats that are common to everyone; they produce ‘political subjects and political possibilities’ 
through the construction of the harms we are concerned with socially and the authorization of 
particular responses to them.38 ‘Human rights activism is a moral-political project and if it 
displaces, competes with, refuses, or rejects other political projects, including those also aimed at 
producing justice, then it is not merely a tactic but a particular form of political power carrying a 
particular image of justice.’39 While Ignatieff argues that the moral-political project of human rights 
is not objectionable because it merely provides the basic requirements for any decent society, on 
closer inspection he is concerned with quite a lot more than protecting bodies. Human rights in 
Ignatieff’s reading go hand in hand with the development of individual autonomy, provide the basis 
for social and economic security, and plant the seeds of toleration that can develop into a liberal 
political culture.40 
 
The fact that human rights are inevitably about more than the alleviation of suffering comes 
about because they address that suffering in terms of the formal legal equality of individuals before 
the state, who are free to act in competitive and unequal civil society. Brown concludes that 
Ignatieff’s minimalism ‘would seem to be as much a brief for capitalism as for human rights,’ as 
the protection guaranteed to the autonomous individual (rather than merely the suffering body) he 
privileges is postulated as the cause of economic prosperity and legal representation. Brown objects 
to this, noting that it is ‘a strange history of modernity, especially in its suggestion that national 
wealth is produced by rather than productive of civil liberties and constitutionalism and in its 
elision of the deformations of colonialism and a global economy in which the wealth of core states 
is predicated in part on the poverty of the periphery.’41 Rather than reflecting a distinctive personal 
failing on the part of Iganatieff, Brown’s critique of rights suggests that it is the ideology of liberal 
constitutionalism that makes it difficult to see that rights are a feature of social power that ‘does not 
only come in sovereign or juridical form’ and as rights construct individuals in particular ways, 
they are ‘not just defenses against social and political power but are, as an aspect of 
governmentality, a crucial aspect of power’s aperture.’42 This also means that human rights will 
tend to co-opt or supersede alternative political-moral projects seeking more political and 
comprehensive visions of justice. 
 
Brown’s critique reveals how a concern to prevent certain forms of state violence and 
increase the autonomy of individuals supports ‘liberal imperialism and global free trade’, while 
missing the human suffering caused by ‘the relatively unchecked globalization of capital, 
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postcolonial political deformations, and superpower imperialism combing to disenfranchise peoples 
in many parts of the first, second, and third worlds from the prospects of self-governance to a 
degree historically unparalleled in modernity’.43 It is not only that those individuals and 
communities that do not recognize the universal standard are marginalized – the primary concern 
for both Cohen and Benhabib; it is that the unrecognized suffering of human beings is made 
invisible and the possibilities of eliminating such suffering are limited to those authorized within 
the given order, which enables the very harms in need of redress.44 It is vital to liberal neo-imperial 
powers that they can claim to be acting in the name of human rights and to possess the moral 
authority to declare and interpret those rights. Brown’s point is not that supporters of human rights 
want this, but that such political relations are written into the logic of human rights. For that reason, 
Brown’s account of human rights carries a sense of betrayal that suggests that whatever the past 
value of human rights for emancipatory politics might have been, they have been badly 
compromised. 
 
Nor, again, am I contesting the extent to which human rights campaigns may actually 
limit certain kinds of abuse and alter certain policies. Rather, the point is that there is no 
such thing as mere reduction of suffering or protection from abuse—the nature of the 
reduction or protection is itself productive of political subjects and political 
possibilities. Just as abuse itself is never generic but always has particular social and 
subjective content, so the matter of how it is relieved is consequential. Yes, the abuse 
must be stopped but by whom, with what techniques, with what unintended effects, and 
above all, unfolding what possible futures?45  
 
The full measure of the negative consequences of the neo-imperial politics of human rights is 
captured in the way those politics structure the relations between dominate and subordinate states in 
our postcolonial age. Human rights not only sanctify the interests of powerful liberal states with 
moral purpose, but they also justify the hierarchies that separate the civilized and capable north 
from the under-developed and incapable south.46 As Gayatri Spivak notes, the presumption that one 
has a responsibility to define and protect the rights of others is built on a separation that not only 
assumes but also institutionally ensures that human rights “victims” cannot help themselves.47 This 
hierarchical dynamic justifies interventions in the social, economic and political affairs of 
subordinate states, which is a relationship that persists even when individuals in subordinate states 
make use of human rights or participate in the interventions of dominant states and institutions. The 
human rights project claims to protect victims of violence from the worst harms by limiting state 
power and encouraging moral action by the international community – but a critical analysis of the 
consequences of the politics of human rights undermines any assumption of straightforward 
benevolence.  
 
At one level, this analysis does not contradict what Cohen and Benhabib suggest is 
necessary for effective human rights – universal standards to limit and discipline politics – but it 
does suggest that the prospects of this are more problematic than those authors are willing to 
consider, as the account of the political consequences of human rights offered by Brown’s critique 
speaks against the desirability of a universalizing political morality that seeks to constrain state 
power through protections of fundamental rights guaranteed by the very sovereign authority they 
are intended to limit. It is noteworthy that Brown is unwilling to completely reject the idea of 
human rights. She acknowledges that the universal concern that partly defines human rights is 
important, and that their contribution to emancipatory political struggles has been valuable. Yet she 
is hesitant to endorse a vision of human rights because of the limits it places on what justice can 
achieve, and beyond this more theoretical worry there is also an unwillingness to endorse an idea 
that she see as complicit in a anti-democratic and neo-imperial politics. While Brown shows the 
limits of conventional rights politics, it also raises an important question about where this leads. Do 
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rights always lead us to the abandonment of politics? More accurately, it leaves us with a limited 
politics where the terms of political discourse are set within an essentially liberal and capitalist 
order, which itself seeks to legalize politics and to reduce the transformative capacity of claims for 
liberty, equality, and justice. Kenneth Baynes challenges Brown’s focus on the formal character of 
rights, which suggests that they may have transformative potential that she underemphasizes by 
ignoring their use in practical political reformations that renew democratic polities.48 Nonetheless, 
getting beyond the limits of liberal constitutionalism, for Brown, requires something more 
revolutionary as she sees such practical rights politics as necessarily reinforcing the liberal state. 
Yet, by embracing the poststructuralist suspicion of narratives of a future and true emancipation 
there is a real risk of a retreat from politics and a difficulty in articulating new projects. While 
Brown is aware of this ambiguous and precarious position, she thinks rights are not particularly 
useful for escaping this predicament beyond offering broad ideals that inspire us to pursue political 
change.49  
 
 Many critics share Brown’s ambiguous rejection and partial endorsement of rights;50 
Giorgio Agamben, however, completes this anti-universalist line of critique by calling on us to 
abandon and go beyond human rights. While Agamben shares Brown’s focus on the construction of 
subjects by human rights, he also incorporates Hannah Arendt’s analysis. Arendt argued that human 
rights are meaningless because a person reduced to their bare humanity is an individual without 
political community, without the hope of having effective rights.51 The granting of legal 
personhood only completes the depoliticization of the individual as human, for the individual 
deprived of politics is only ever subject to the law, never its author. Arendt goes on to argue that the 
universal law, necessary to human rights, is ineffective in truly emancipating individuals – even if 
their human rights are protected, it is the pity of the powerful and not the power of right that 
protects the individual reduced to bar humanity. In Arendt’s hands the only human right is the 
“right to have rights,” which requires either inclusion in a nation-state or a new global polis not yet 
seen in human history.52 In either case, human rights only become effective rights when they are 
remade as the rights of citizens within a political community. As Andrew Schaap notes, for Arendt 
the struggle ‘for the right to have rights can only be understood as a liberation that would establish 
the conditions of possibility for the actualization of freedom.’53 Through this analysis we get to a 
human right to engage in politics. While this promises more than the formal recognition that Brown 
finds, the difficulty of actualizing such a right globally, much less within national states, suggests 
that the promise of human rights is limited at best.   
 
 Agamben pushes this critique even further by focusing on the way in which rights depend 
upon the distinction between those who have rights as members of the political community and 
those that are excluded – between bios and zoē. Human rights attempt to privilege the bare life of 
human beings without a place in the political world, which is why Agamben sees the displaced or 
stateless individual as the exemplary subject of human rights. However, it is the sovereign that has 
the power to make this distinction, the exclusion of some life from the political community, the 
creation of “bare life”. As rights are supposed to attach to human beings as such, rather than as 
members of a particular nation, it seems that the law achieves justification beyond convention, 
beyond the shared sense of justice that makes a People, but in fact it reveals that the law depends 
upon the power of the sovereign who ultimately decides which human beings have their rights 
protected and which find themselves excluded totally, most tellingly in the camp. This critique of 
human rights depends upon Agamben’s understanding of the sovereign as ‘the point of indistinction 
between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes 
over into violence.’54 The pure bio-politics we find in the relationship between Homo Sacer and the 
sovereign, who decides whether bare human life is extinguished or preserved, reveals that the effort 
to remove rights from a given order (to transform civil right into human rights) renders those rights 
precarious, dependent on exceptional power of the sovereign rather than a universal law. On this 
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reading, human rights cannot constrain authority because they are dependent upon it, nor do they 
enable transformations of the legal and political order because they confirm rather than claim 
power. Agamben suggests that rights are not ambiguous in their support of authority and control, 
but rather central to it at the most fundamental level.  
 
More troubling still, human rights are the logical development of the rights of the citizen, 
which seemed to be guaranteed by her membership in the political community, but this is revealed 
as a fiction through the plight of refugees whose human rights are ignored. Human rights depend on 
the willingness of the sovereign to grant them, and the stateless persons condition makes this act of 
power explicit, revealing the way in which the rights of citizens are just as precarious once the 
mythology of national belonging is stripped away.  
 
Rights, in other words, are attributed to the human being only to the degree to which 
he or she is the immediately vanishing presupposition (and, in fact, the presupposition 
that must never come to light as such) of the citizen. If the refugee represents such a 
disquieting element in the order of the nation-state, this is so primarily because, by 
breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and 
nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis.55 
 
The ability of states to remove the rights of their citizens and the failure of the international 
community to protect the human rights of those stripped of nationality reveal the necessary 
dependence of rights upon the sovereign, such that they cannot moralise or constrain that power.  
 
The separation between humanitarianism and politics that we are experiencing today is 
the extreme phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen. In 
the final analysis, however, humanitarian organizations – which today are more and 
more supported by international commissions – can only grasp human life in the figure 
of the bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity 
with the very powers they ought to fight.56 
 
It is this reading of human rights that leads Agamben to seek a political ethics beyond human rights. 
There are problems with this account. As Schaap notes, Agamben’s invocation of a coming politics 
beyond human rights is ‘more mystifying than the virtual “social contract” that Agamben dismisses. 
Underlying Agamben’s profound pessimism and totalizing critique of human rights is a utopianism 
that does not afford an understanding of the conditions of possibility for social transformation.’57 
Similar to Brown, Agamben’s critique of rights rests on a formal reading of how human rights 
function, rather than an engagement with the details of human rights practice. In both cases, 
however, it is not clear that this blindness is inherent to either Brown or Agamben’s thought, which 
raises the question of why there is a lack of engagement with how human rights are used. As Ayten 
Gündoğdu argues,  
 
Only within the confines of Agamben’s stringent logic, can any politics organized 
around sovereignty and human rights not help but reinscribe the originary violence 
repeated since the beginning of Western political history. The imposition of such a 
logic, which ends up imputing a preordained trajectory to any politics organized around 
sovereignty and human rights, however, is at odds with Agamben’s own efforts to 
understand time and history in terms of inexhaustible potentialities.58 
 
This paradox in critical accounts of human rights, in which the contingency of the world is affirmed 
but the formalism of rights is maintained, I argue, is based on two distinct but related failings. First, 
critics of human rights actually maintain the same relationship between politics and morality that 
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human rights supporters affirm, though in a pessimistic register. The reasons for this are largely 
conceptual, which I argue can be addressed by embracing a pluralistic and immanent political ethics 
as opposed to a legislative and transcendent one. The second failing has to do with the lack of 
engagement with how human rights are used in political struggles, which relates to the conceptual 
failing so far as it is the case that a legislative and transcendent account of ethics gives us little 
reason to attend to such details, but it also reflects an assumption of intellectual privilege that 
determines who can and cannot define the meaning of human rights. 
 
However, the above objections aside, considered together, Brown and Agamben’s criticisms 
suggest that once we abandon transcendent justifications we are left with a necessarily political 
conception of human rights, which is subject to a number of serious objections. Universal human 
rights are revealed as a project that cannot be justified in neutral terms, while they also require an 
appeal to a universal human identity that does violence to difference as it constructs individual 
subjectivities and the institutions of social life in the image of dominant social powers. This is 
especially problematic because it maintains the coercive power of the state and fails to address 
significant social harms endemic to global capitalism. Human rights are then seen to serve the 
interest of powerful actors, both in justifying their actions morally and enabling their dominance, 
including the privilege to determine the meaning of those rights. Further still, these negative 
consequences can be seen as necessary rather than contingent, as the idea of human rights 
reinforces the exceptional power of the sovereign, which is the power that decides which humans 
have full-rights, which have only their human rights, and which have no rights at all. Given the 
depth of this critique the desire to hold on to human rights is difficult to justify. The question that 
we are left with is: should we abandon the idea of human rights? In the following section I argue 
that if we do not want to abandon human rights, then understanding their value and justifying their 
prominence is best served by an agonistic account. 
 
A Politics for Human Rights 
 
Honig offers an important reason for defending human rights: democratic activists use them to fight 
for protections, inclusions and privileges denied by the existing order – and to change that order. If 
we start from this perspective our understanding shifts to focus on the ways that rights can be 
productive beyond offering broad ideals or simply affirming the existing order, on how a new claim 
‘transforms the entire economy of rights and identities, and establishes new relations and new 
realities, new promises and potentially new cruelties.’59 Further, understanding rights claims as 
inherently plural and ambiguous allows us to carry forward a critical stance toward existing regimes 
without suggesting rights necessarily reinforce sovereign power. This agonistic and pluralist 
approach also opens up important connections to human rights practices, enabling us to make better 
sense of the claim that human rights do good work.  
 
An agonistic approach to rights accepts that rights claims will remain political, which is to 
say partial and contestable, but it also embraces the conflict that those political claims generate 
rather than seeing it as an unfortunate condition to be overcome. While this approach offers an 
alternative kind of universalism, drawing attention to how the identity of “humanity” is used in 
rights politics and suggesting a democratizing ethos focused on extending agonistic respect and 
expressing care for the world in its complexity and plurality, it also generates new challenges. Any 
agonistic account of human rights needs to take account of Arendt’s critique, which suggested that 
rights were meaningless if they did not have the force of political authority behind them. Arendt’s 
insight deflates the idea of moral rights that apply to every individual as such, suggesting that the 
‘world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.’60 This implies that rather 
than rights being compromised by politics, engaging in the activity of politics is a condition of 
claiming and having human rights. With this in mind we must consider who has political authority, 
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which has the power to make enforceable decisions. The quality of political authority becomes 
central and is revealed as a vital site of contestation, including what is required to render authority 
legitimate and how the political community that authority addresses is composed.  
 
 The agonistic account of rights I defend departs from Arendt’s work because she carries 
forward a number of presumptions that hinder our thinking. Foremost, as Schaap notes, by locating 
the essence of politics in a type of speech, a form of address shared between equals, Arendt risks 
excluding those lacking full recognition, either because they are outside the polity or because they 
are marginal within it.61 Also Arendt’s account of what is legitimately included in politics is too 
narrow, as it fails to address important spheres of social life, such as the economy and family, as 
subjects of political contestation, unnecessarily playing into the ideological limits of human rights 
identified by Brown. This is problematic if we are looking to further an account of rights where the 
agenda is not already set by the powerful but is instead open to contestation. The key developments 
that Connolly and Honig offer are a move away from thinking about sovereignty as an exceptional 
and singular power that must be constrained (successfully or unsuccessfully) by law, while also 
subverting the notion that membership in the political community can and should be determinate 
(whether it is imagined in national or cosmopolitan dimensions). In place of the conventional 
understanding of the sovereign we get a picture of sovereign power as diffuse and variegated, 
embedded in an expressive milieu that constrains institutional power. Further, in dissolving the 
seeming solidity of sovereignty, Connolly and Honig also suggest that political community should 
be recognized as always incomplete and transforming in complex ways that defy any ideal political 
geography we may try to impose. The contribution, then, of approaching human rights from an 
agonistic and pluralist perspective is that they are no longer universal principles that must both 
legitimize authority and secure universal recognition as expressions of the moral law. This in turn 
avoids the binds that a focus on the exceptional nature of sovereign power over the law creates. 
Human rights in an agonistic register are inherently plural (even contradictory) and contested 
claims that challenge the terms of legitimate authority and membership because the interrelation of 
morality and politics is embraced – so while it becomes impossible to use human rights as simply a 
moral constraint on political power or to see them only as an expression of the superiority of 
politics over the law, the ambiguity created pays dividends by opening up our understanding of the 
important and varied directions in which human rights politics can, and have, developed. 
 
Reconstructing Human Rights 
 
 Sovereign power, the force that underwrites the efficacy of law, is a central but under 
examined reference point when thinking about human rights. Supporters of human rights see 
them as a tool for constraining the sovereign, using moral principles and legal institutions to 
bind the imagined hands of the executive force of government. Critics worry that human 
rights become a weapon in those same hands. In either case, however, we know that there is 
no singular sovereign and the political power that makes authority effective is more 
complicated and less unitary.62 Connolly emphasizes the plural nature of sovereignty by 
considering two of its dimensions separately.   
 
Sovereign is that which decides an exception exists and how to decide it, with the that 
composed of a plurality of forces circulating through and under the positional 
sovereignty of the official arbitrating body. Such a result may discourage those who 
seek a tight explanation of the economic and political causes of legal action (the 
realists), a closed model of legal process (the idealists), or a tight model of legal 
paradox (the paradoxicalists). But it illuminates the complexity of sovereignty. It has 
another advantage, too: it points to strategic issues and sites to address for those who 
seek to introduce a robust pluralism into the ethos of sovereignty.63  
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The positional sovereignty of officials identify the nodes of power within the structure of 
governance, which are in turn constituted and constrained by expressive sovereignty, which is made 
up of both broad social sensibilities (which are plural and contested) regarding what is and is not 
tolerable in the exercise of positional sovereignty, and the institutions of civil society that express 
and develop those sensibilities. 
 
Importantly, even in its positional dimension sovereignty is plural and contested. Without 
succumbing to hyper-globalization fantasies, Connolly notes that with the continued development 
of global capitalism and the spread of international law, the conventional geography of national 
sovereignty is slowly reconfigured, leaving the state less powerful in some realms (economics) and 
more intent to express its authority in others (security).64 For example, through developments in 
international trade law institutional sovereignty is increasingly located not with state officials but 
with authorities empowered to resolve disputes between investors and states.65 Honig supplements 
this understanding of positional sovereignty by focusing on the role of bureaucrats, rather than 
judges and executives, whose powers lie in the everyday administration of government. These 
powers, however, are not only effective as conduits of sovereign decisions; they can challenge 
sovereign authority and exercise their own independent power.66 This makes sovereignty both more 
difficult to constrain – which is part of Honig’s worry about Benhabib’s cosmopolitan project of 
global governance67 – and less exceptional. Understanding the power exercised by political 
authorities in less dramatic terms enables us to see a more complex relationship between morality, 
law, and politics, in which human rights have an ambiguous role. 
 
 Looking to the expressive dimension of sovereign, however, does more to alter our 
understanding of the role that human rights play. To illustrate the concept, Connolly examines the 
2000 US presidential election, in which the positional sovereignty of the US Supreme Court seemed 
decisive, to suggest that the official decision was enabled by the expressive sovereignty of the 
Republican party, which was able to demand a decisive resolution of the election through direct 
activism, institutional power within the Florida state government, and public pressure applied 
through the news media. He also considers the sorts of expressive sovereignty that could have 
opposed the authority of the court – forms of counter mobilization and protest in favor of a rigorous 
adherence to fair and accurate elections.68 More broadly, the exercise of authority always takes 
place within a social milieu that enables and contests that authority, which Connolly begins to 
describe as an abstract machine – contrasting an anti-cosmopolitan global machine with a counter 
pluralist-cosmopolitan machine, in both cases these global resonance machines generate the social 
and moral conditions necessary to exercise authority effectively.69  
 
 Human rights function differently within this understanding of sovereign power. First, they 
alter the institutional dimension of sovereignty by suggesting that certain privileges and duties must 
be enacted and protected by any legitimate authority. They also alter the composition of the 
political community because the appeal to “humanity” as a political identity exceeds established 
categories of membership, which means human rights either advocate for new people to be included 
or for existing members to be included in the political community in new ways. Institutionally, this 
means that human rights push in various directions, as they can reinforce citizenship rights by 
insisting that they be expanded to new categories of people, or they can demand new forms of 
authority beyond the national state. The vital conceptual point is that they do not necessarily serve 
as a fundamental justification for the state, nor do they underwrite a necessary cosmopolitan 
transformation.  
 
The second way that human rights function is as claims on expressive sovereignty that carry 
forward a universal ethos. Human rights in an agonistic and pluralist register remain universal, but 
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their necessary universalism is formal rather than substantive, as the category of humanity is 
fundamentally ambiguous but formally maximally inclusive. Therefore, anyone can potentially 
affirm or join in human rights politics, but the meaning of “humanity” – the privileges and 
protections it justifies – is not agreed upon by everyone. Discussing Kantian-inspired universalism, 
Connolly justifies this turn to a contestable account: 
 
Today the specific terms of that cosmopolitanism have not only become even more 
contestable, they carry with them elements of a dogmatic Western imperialism still 
in need of reconstruction. One key, in my judgment, is to relinquish the demand that 
all reasonable people in all cultures must actually or implicitly recognize the logic of 
morality in the same way Kant did. Or even as neo-Kantians do. Once this pivot of 
Kantian morality is treated as a contestable act of faith, it becomes possible to 
engage a late-modern world of speed and dense interdependencies in which 
cosmopolitanism involves the difficult task of coming to terms receptively and 
reciprocally with multiple and contending universals.70 
 
He argues for a double-entry universalism that is based on the contestability and multiplicity of 
universals, which arise as a consequence of the pluralism and uncertainty that defines our 
experience of the world. This provides a different ground for thinking about human rights, as a 
pluralizing human rights ideal would embrace rather than deny the contestability of humanity as a 
moral and political identity. In keeping the human identity open and contested, a reconstruction of 
human rights committed to pluralism presents unique opportunities for political action. 
 
 If we embrace a pluralizing human rights ethos, the normal function of universal morality is 
lost, as what we seek in human rights ceases to be a justification of the authority of law, but rather 
an alternative sensibility that guides human rights as a politics that seeks to be both inclusive and 
open. In his critique of conventional morality, epitomized in the figure of St Augustine, Connolly 
suggests that we need to move away from a legislative understanding of morality.71 Instead, 
Connolly suggests that politics can be guided by an ethos, which is a general sensibility attuned to 
the particular ends and values that we try to infuse into our actions, habits and institutions. This 
ethics of cultivation, aspires not to ‘a Law or categorical imperative, but possibilities of [an ethos] 
being imperfectly installed in established institutional practices.’72 Human rights as a political ethos 
would point towards expanding our moral concern as widely as possible, as well as pursuing 
openness towards difference. Such an ethos could be generated from numerous different 
orientations – what Connolly calls existential faiths73 – and could be expressed in many different 
forms. While this fundamentally undermines the philosopher’s privilege as a law-giver, Connolly 
outlines two virtues that he thinks are important for a universal ethos that is pluralizing and 
democratizing in intent: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. The pluralizing and 
democratizing ethos that I suggest can be developed as a human right ethos is itself contestable but, 
I argue, it responds to the key criticisms of human rights discussed thus far while also helping us to 
better see the political work that human rights do, especially in the hands of democratic activists. 
 
 The first virtue that Connolly defends, agonistic respect, responds to his extended argument 
that our individual and social identities are fragile and contingent, susceptible to challenge and 
alteration. This is so because human experience is defined by pluralism, of experiences, of core 
values, and of ways of living, such that when we seek certainty and security we do violence to the 
difference we find in others and ourselves. In order to overcome this tendency, Connolly advises 
that we develop agonistic respect, which requires that we recognize that our own ‘highest and most 
entrenched faith is legitimately contestable’ by others, and should guide how negotiations are 
carried out publically and dissuade anyone from presuming their final faith can be imposed upon 
others.74 This virtue does not reduce to either a form of relativism or liberal tolerance, as the focus 
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is on how the necessary political contest between different views is conducted. Recognizing that 
one’s own beliefs are contingent and contestable does not make judgment impossible or 
inadvisable, the question is rather how judgments of right and wrong are made, whether they 
demand exclusive recognition and security, or whether they admit their ambiguity and fragility. 
This also presents a more open ethos than liberal tolerance, which likewise lacks the imperative to 
self-interrogation and doubt. 
 
 The second virtue, critical responsiveness, responds to the blindness we each carry with us, 
to our privilege, to our habits, and to our ignorance. This virtue carries forward Connolly’s concern 
with genealogy and deconstruction as methods of interrogating ethical and political ideals, which 
seek to bring to light the remainders generated by the values we endorse and to expose the hidden 
power relationships of our practices. He describes critical responsiveness as ‘careful listening and 
presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded 
subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one 
or more of those registers.’75 Working with agonistic respect, critical responsiveness is essentially a 
virtue of modesty for the powerful, calling upon those with privilege to seek to understand the 
claims of those marginalized by the given order, and to offer solidarity to their efforts to claim a 
place within the social order or to change it more profoundly. It is also this virtue that instills a 
political program of democratization in agnostic pluralism, as it seeks to include the excluded in the 
political arena, even so far as the excluded may seek to alter the very terms and institutions in 
which politics is conducted. 
 
 Embedding these virtues into an agonistic and pluralist ethos of human rights responds to 
the criticisms outlined above. No longer concerned with a legislative account of universalism, 
human rights can attend more effectively to difference. By basing human rights in a pluralizing 
ethos, we also acknowledge the politics of any particular articulation of human rights without 
justifying it as inherently more reasonable than others. Further, critical responsiveness encourages 
those who support existing human rights to remain mindful of the exclusions and remainder they 
generate, to attend to the harms they fail to address. And, most importantly, it focuses on the use of 
human rights as tools of creative political action that can fundamentally upset the social order. 
 
Honig brings a number of Connolly's insights to an explicit consideration of human rights. 
She argues that when a human right is initially claimed it calls a new social world into being that 
has yet to be institutionalized. This reveals that the exercise of power is at the heart of emergent 
rights claims, as much as it is in established rights. Honig rejects the attempts by Rawlsians and 
Habermasians to resolve this paradox of politics, either confirming the legitimacy of authority in an 
achieved consensus or projecting it upon a future convergence yet to come.  
 
Looking backward, we can say with satisfaction that the chrono-logic of rights 
required and therefore delivered the eventual inclusion of women, Africans, and 
native peoples into the schedule of formal rights. But what actually did the work? 
The impulsion of rights, their chrono-logic, or the political actors who won the 
battles they were variously motivated to fight and whose contingent victories were 
later credited not to the actors but to the independent trajectory of rights as such?76 
 
In contrast to this account, Honig suggests that human rights are a politics of enactment, which 
connects them to a democratic and activist orientation. Rather than pursuing a judicial model of 
human rights, where each successive iteration is interpreted and harmonized within the established 
right regime, Honig highlights the role human rights have in brining about new goods, putting 
degraded political identities on the register of recognition and respect, and encouraging a 
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democratic global politics that remains open to pluralism and unexpected newness generated by the 
interaction of difference on multiple registers. 
 
This implies that human rights politics exceeds the legalized discourses and practices of the 
international human rights regime, reconnecting human rights claims with the political 
contestations and social movements that have led to the establishment of new rights. What this 
exposes is the always present power necessary in seeking to change the social order, such that the 
emergence of social and economic rights, or the women's human rights movement were not 
fulfillments of the human rights vision, complete from the start, but contests to reconstruct the 
legitimacy of social orders that sustained economic dependence and poverty, or the exclusion and 
abuse of women. What results from this reconstruction of rights is not an ever more magisterial 
international human rights regime institutionalized through cosmopolitan global governance, nor a 
state-centric order of minimal rights claims, but rather a human rights ethos. The end of human 
rights is not consensus, but instead the generation of a space for contesting existing identities and 
sites of political authority. Human rights, if imbued with a pluralizing and democratizing ethos, 
alter political practice at multiple levels and across communities because they are claims that can be 
made on behalf of a variety of political actors against a variety of political authorities. For example, 
individuals may claim rights of protection from state violence from international organizations, 
rather than their government; or indigenous groups may make claims upon corporations demanding 
a contribution towards, or even provision of, public services. The articulation of new rights claims 
in a global context serves to redefine the lines of political authority and community.  
 
Because human rights upset the social order, new (or even reiterated) human rights claims 
can engender panic among established constituencies – giving rights to irregular migrants or 
extending human rights to include protections against the structural violence created by economic 
policies leading to inequality and deprivation, for example, are controversial and contested. 
Importantly, new rights claims are recognized as dangerous in an agonistic perspective, because 
they exert power and cannot be fully or finally justified, therefore they compel with force. 
However, contra both Brown and Agamben, the use of human rights to justify neo-conservative 
interventions or to provide moral justification for the expansion of competitive forms of neoliberal 
capitalism is not endemic to the idea as such, rather it is a form of human rights politics to be 
opposed and contested with a more generous and critical human rights ethos, and opposed through 
counter-claims that suggest new forms of authority and community. In the end, though, human 
rights also have a no special privilege as a universal ethos; we may yet find better ways of 
expressing universal aspirations and fighting for political change. 
 
Re-envisioning Human Rights 
 
 While Connolly and Honig help us reconstruct human rights conceptually, the move to see 
human rights from an agonistic and pluralist perspective generates new challenges. First, the lack of 
sustained engagement with how human rights are actually used, which is endemic in philosophical 
reflections on rights, cannot be justified if we accept an agonistic understanding of rights. We must 
attend to what rights do – and while Connolly and Honig do this to a limited degree, notably 
looking at political movement defending homosexual rights, the right to die, and ecological rights 
concerned with animal welfare and food production, the frame of reference is limited. The same 
criticism applies to Cohen, Benhabib, Brown and Agamben – though they have perhaps more 
conceptual justification for the distance they retain from the multitude of ways that human rights 
are (and have been) used in global politics.  
 
 There is not space to engage in this deeper study of human rights practice here,77 but I do 
want to highlight two important limits existing theoretical reflections continue to carry with them, 
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even among those inclined to appeal to the promising ambiguities of those practices. First, theorists 
of rights need to be attentive to who is visible in the historical and contemporary practice of human 
rights. The virtue of critical responsiveness calls on us to apply this orientation in our own work. 
Honig, for example, rightly criticizes the way Habermas references “Philadelphia” and “Paris” as 
key historical events that initiate the rights project, and whose reasonable trace we can appeal to in 
contemporary practice. Yet, in that criticism she does not reference alternative historical 
articulations of human rights that could provide even more critical purchase than her reference to 
the complex and unfinished projects inaugurated in Philadelphia and Paris. Where is “Port-au-
Prince” as one of the great rights revolutions, in which enslaved peoples rebelled against their 
oppressors and declared their own rights in opposition to colonialism and racism? This not to 
question Honig’s choices, but to highlight the blindness theorists risk carrying forward through a 
lack of historical knowledge. If we consider rights in an agonistic and pluralist perspective, then 
surely the Haitian revolution, too often understood only as a slave revolt, presents a vital counter-
example to universal narratives that end up privileging Western subjectivities and experiences.78 
This blindness also extends to contemporary rights practices. While the examples Connolly and 
Honig explore are important, they actually tend to focus on rights politics that do not challenge the 
existing order so much as make the case for inclusion of currently excluded groups. Other writers 
have focused on the claims of stateless peoples to have rights, which does more to highlight the 
way human rights can be used to upset the given boundaries of political membership. Yet, there are 
many more challenging human rights movements that theorists could look to in order to grasp the 
diversity of what human rights can achieve. For example, the global movement to claim a right to 
land and housing, which connects activists in Brazil occupying unused land to set up autonomous 
communities (the Landless Workers Movement) to communities in South Africa fighting illegal 
evictions (West Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign), and to political organizers in the United States 
seeking to occupy abandoned and foreclosed homes (Take Back the Land). These varied 
movements, articulated in terms of human rights, fundamentally challenges basic tenets of political 
and economic relations, for example basing land rights on social need, refusing the authority of the 
state to regulate property, and fighting for communal forms of ownership.79 An agonistic and 
pluralist human rights theory must engage more broadly to understand the possibilities and limits of 
human rights as a universal political ethos. 
 
 The second limit that an agonistic human rights theory must attend to is the tendency of 
established authorities to capture and dominate the discourse of rights, to take emergent rights 
claims and mold them in ways that blunt their transformative power. Importantly, attending to this 
is not done through theoretical critique along (as in the case of Agamben’s, and to a lesser extent 
Brown’s, work) but rather in considering the political realities at work. Upendra Baxi, for example, 
traces the ways the right to development lost its critical edge as a discourse opposing the neo-
imperial expansion of liberal models of economic development not only because of the theoretical 
limits of the rights discourse but because of the hierarchical power structures that define human 
rights within international institutions.80 Makau Mutua also highlights the way Western states use 
their political power to stifle a substantive discussion about economic human rights that actually 
considers the deprivation and poverty of millions as crime for which individuals and institutions 
could be held accountable.81 Again, this insight is actually brought out by thinking of human rights 
in agonistic terms, but nonetheless a challenge remains to connect theoretical reflection to more 
robust understanding of human rights as a complex and contested practice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the end, human rights must prove their worth as a political ethos and an institutional project – 
that is the key insight gained by thinking agonistically about rights. This, I think, is an improvement 
over the tendency to see human rights as a moral universal that must be defended though ever more 
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sophisticated theoretical contortions, or as a fundamentally compromised and limited project. Not 
only does an agonistic view enable us to respond to the most pressing criticisms of human rights, it 
also opens up space to interrogate the defense of human rights based in their supposedly positive 
consequences. These improvements are achieved in part by reconsidering what human rights do, 
focusing on their formal emptiness as claims upon the social order made in terms of the ambiguous 
notion of humanity. Yet, the ethical content of human rights as an emancipatory project is sustained 
by thinking of them as a universal ethos, which I have defended in terms of pluralizing and 
democratizing political life in ways that expand our moral concern and challenge us to increase the 
substantive control people have over their lives.  
 
 Human rights may be used cynically and the discourse of humanity will always tempt the 
powerful to impose themselves, only sometimes with good intentions, on those who are oppressed 
and marginalized. These are worries that a critical human rights theory must attend to continuously. 
There is danger in universal politics. Further, human rights, in their ubiquity and universalism, risk 
overshadowing other alternative projects, which they have no warrant to do – and this fundamental 
contestability should be kept in mind. The suffering and hope that finds an outlet in political ethics 
may find new and more powerful forms of expression, we must keep this possibility alive in our 
thinking to avoid becoming blind to the human hands that seek to wield human rights as an idol 
rather than a tool. 
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